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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel deep learning
and blockchain-based energy framework for Smart Grids, en-
titled DeepCoin. The DeepCoin framework uses two schemes,
a blockchain-based scheme and a deep learning-based scheme.
The blockchain-based scheme consists of five phases; setup phase,
agreement phase, creating a block phase and consensus-making
phase, and view change phase. It incorporates a novel reliable
peer-to-peer energy system that is based on the practical Byzan-
tine fault tolerance algorithm and it achieves high throughput.
In order to prevent smart grid attacks, the proposed framework
makes the generation of blocks using short signatures and
hash functions. The proposed deep learning-based scheme is an
intrusion detection system (IDS), which employs recurrent neural
networks (RNNs) for detecting network attacks and fraudulent
transactions in the blockchain-based energy network. We study
the performance of the proposed IDS on three different sources
the CICIDS2017 dataset, a Power System dataset, and a Bot-IoT
dataset.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart Grid, Machine Learning,
Security, IDS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The world’s electricity consumption is increased every
year, reflecting the growth in the number of electric devices.
According to a report published in 2018 [1] about energy
consumption in the UK provides that electricity consumption
in the UK increased by 33% to 15 ktoe. The renewable
energy sources provide nearly 20% of U.S. electricity (e.g., hy-
dropower, biomass, biofuels, wind geothermal, solar) in 2017
[2]. In order to modernize public electricity infrastructures,
many electric power companies are interested in deploying
smart grids using communication networks and renewable
energies.
The smart grid consists of a set of computers, controllers,
automation, and standard communication protocols, which are
connected on the Internet, all of which are used in order to
manage the generation and distribution of electricity to con-
sumers through these digital technologies [3]. A community
solar panels network in the smart grid could consolidate to
the overall energy infrastructure of the smart city by creating
additional energy storage. The main issue in the development
of a smart grid is not located at the physical support but mainly
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in ensuring both security and privacy, which has become
a major concern for the cyber security research community
[4]. An adversary can launch internal and external attacks
(e.g., false data injection and denial of service attacks) in
order to disrupt the operation of the smart grid [5]. Examples
include modification operations on the electricity data via
eavesdropping attack and distributed denial of service attacks
on the network communication protocols (i.e., TCP/IP, HTTP,
UDP)[6].
Blockchain is an emerging technology that can lever-
age enterprise data using secure transactions among parties.
Blockchain technology-enabled business and technological
systems is a new trend rising fast in the area of engineering
management [7]. Managers are expected to use Blockchain
technology in the near future in order to solve problems
and create new opportunities across industries (e.g., supply
chain management, logistics, and product origin tracking) [8].
Recent studies have utilized blockchain technology to establish
secure data sharing for the management of Smart Grid [9],
[10], [11], [12]. Although blockchain is one of the promising
technologies for securing the management of technology and
innovation, it suffers from some vulnerabilities related to
data privacy, along with a number of personal identity risks
as discussed in [13]. In order to deal with these issues,
novel technologies and approaches such as intrusion detection
systems and machine learning techniques should be adopted.
In this paper, we propose a novel deep learning and
blockchain-based energy framework, named DeepCoin, for
protecting the smart grid from cyber attacks. Specifically, the
main contributions of this paper are as follows.:
• We propose a new blockchain-based scheme for facili-
tating the exchange of excess energy among neighbor-
ing nodes. To achieve privacy-preservation, the proposed
scheme employs bi-linear pairing, short signatures, and
hash functions.
• We introduce how the practical Byzantine fault toler-
ance (PBFT) algorithm can achieve consensus inside
blockchain-based energy network.
• We propose a novel Deep learning-based scheme using
a recurrent neural network (RNN) for detecting net-
work attacks and fraudulent transactions. For training an
RNN, we use the truncated backpropagation through time
(BPTT) algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study that combines blockchain technology with
deep learning using a truncated BPTT algorithm into one
architecturally secure framework for the smart grid.
2• We provide various experimental results using Tensor-
Flow on three datasets, the CICIDS2017 dataset, a Power
System dataset, and a Bot-IoT dataset.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
review related work in section I and provide the preliminaries
in Section II. Section III presents our DeepCoin framework,
followed by performance evaluation in Section IV. Finally, we
conclude this paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we mainly describe the relevant work in
three different areas of a smart grid, blockchain, IDS, and
combinations blockchain technology with deep learning.
1) Blockchain for Smart Grid: In the work by Pop et al.
[9], an architecture based on the blockchain is proposed for
distributed management in low/medium voltage smart grids.
The blockchain distributed consensus is used for demand
response verification. The Ethereum coin is used as the coin to
pay for energy while Solidity is used for implementing smart
contracts. In addition, energy traces of UK buildings were used
to validate and test the proposed model.
For privacy preserving of energy trading, Aitzhan and
Svetinovic [10] combined blockchain with multi-signatures
and anonymous messaging streams for decentralized energy
trading network. The study implemented a proof-of-concept,
entitled PriWatt, which was inspired from the Bitcoin. The
PriWatt system is efficient against double-spending attacks
using hashes of blocks, which are computationally difficult. Li
et al. [11] introduced a credit-based payment scheme for IIoT.
The study proposed three ideas, including, 1) a unified energy
blockchain, 2) a credit-based payment, and 3) an optimal
pricing strategy. The unified energy blockchain consists of
three entities, energy nodes, energy aggregators, and smart
meters. Li et al.’s scheme is efficient against double-spending
attacks.
Guan et al. [12] proposed a privacy-preserving and data
aggregation scheme for power grid communications. The study
divided users into different groups and each group has a private
blockchain. To hide user’s identity, the study applies the idea
of multiple pseudonyms. Compared with the conventional
authentication framework, the study shows some significant
advantage in term of computational cost. To provide trans-
parency and provenance, Gao et al. [14] presented a secured
sovereign blockchain framework, named GridMonitoring, for
the smart grid. The GridMonitoring framework uses smart con-
tracts between consumers and utility companies for protecting
consumer data recorded and transferred. In addition, Grid-
Monitoring adopts three cryptographic primitives, including,
consumer private key, consumer public key, and authenticator
contract key. Fan and Zhang [15] proposed a data aggregation
and regulation mechanism for the smart grid. Based on a con-
sortium blockchain and the hybrid signcryption scheme, the
proposed mechanism can be applied to multidimensional data
acquisition and multiple receivers. The performance evaluation
shows that the proposed mechanism significant advantages
in terms of computation and communication overhead for
multidimensional data compared to multidimensional data
aggregation schemes in the multilevel network.
Gai et al. [16] introduced a privacy-preserving energy
trading framework using consortium blockchain. The Gai et
al.’s framework implemented B-Box on the smart contract of
consortium blockchain. For detecting fixed bounds, the study
uses a dynamic-style bound, which can detect data mining-
based attacks. To achieving a parallel trading growth, the study
introduced a parameter, called an Approximate Maximum
Estimate (AME). The AME parameter can estimate value
for an individual seller’s trading volume. The performance
evaluation in Hyperledger Fabric 1.0 shows that the proposed
model can find many sellers whose energy sale were noticeably
different from other sellers. In order to address the privacy
protections and energy security, Gai et al. [17] proposed a
model permissioned blockchain edge model, named PBEM,
which it combines blockchain and edge computing technolo-
gies. Specifically, the PBEM model uses group two techniques,
including, signatures and covert channel authorization, to
guarantee users’ validity. The experiment results show that
the execution time range of the proposed PBEM model was
from 1ms to 14ms, for task allocations in edge computing.
2) IDS for Smart Grid: To protect advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) from malicious attacks in smart grids,
Faisal et al. [18] proposed an IDS based on the evolving
classification algorithms. The study uses an open source data
stream mining framework, named MOA. The approach was
tested on the KDD CUP 1999 dataset and was proven to
perform well in terms of memory and time consumption. The
KDD dataset that was used is outdated and of very limited
practical value for a modern IDS since it doesn’t consider
threats of a smart grid. Jokar and Leung [19] presented
an intrusion detection system, entitled HANIDPS, for smart
grids using ZigBee. The HANIDPS system considers three
categories of three models against advanced metering infras-
tructure, including, 1) Illegitimate remote turn-on/off com-
mands, when an adversary passively eavesdrops the network
traffic, 2) Stealing customer information, when an adversary
impersonates ID of the energy management system, and 3)
Denial of service against network nodes, when an adversary
tries to gain control of a specific device. The HANIDPS system
combines a model-based intrusion detection method and a
machine learning-based prevention technique. The HANIDPS
system was tested on an IEEE 802.15.4 network (it contained
six nodes, including 4 air monitors, an adversary, and a
genuine node) and was proven to be efficient against IEEE
802.15.4 attacks, i.e., radio Jamming, replay-attacks, back-off
manipulation, DoS against GTS requests, etc.
Zhou et al. [20] proposed a deep neural network model in or-
der to classify cyber-attacks in the smart grid. To detect smart
grid attacks, the study follows three steps, a data acquisition
step, a data pre-processing step, and a deep neural network
classification step. The data acquisition step collected 4559799
samples, 1064720 being positive samples and 3495079 neg-
ative samples (R2L attack, U2R attack, DOS attack, and
PROBING attack). The study showed good accuracy with
96,31% compared to traditional machine learning algorithms,
including, K-Nearest Neighborhood, Linear Regression, and
Random Forest.
33) Combining blockchain with machine learning: Liu et
al. [21] proposed a data collection sharing framework for
IIoT applications. They proposed the combination of Ethereum
blockchain and deep reinforcement learning (DRL). For stor-
ing and sharing data, they used Ethereum nodes, which were
classified into two categories: 1) Mining nodes and 2) Non-
mining nodes. The DRL algorithm used three basic compo-
nents, states, actions and rewards. A state is a description
of the environment for IIoT applications. An action is the
moving direction and distance of mobile terminals. A reward
is based on the collection amount achieved, geographical
fairness and energy consumption. According to the study, the
DRL algorithm can increase the geographical fairness ratio by
34.5% compared to a random solution.
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Fig. 1: Conceptual architecture of a smart grid. 1) HANs sell
the surplus production to the electricity grid. 2) HANs have
solar panels installed on their roofs which are connected to
the local solar production network. 3) Electric vehicles act as
energy storage devices.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. System model
As presented in Fig. 1, the smart grid architecture consists of
three types of network architecture, including, home area net-
work (HAN), building area network (BAN), and neighborhood
area network (NAN) [3]. In order to facilitate communication
among devices in each home, the HAN network uses two types
of digital networks, namely, wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN), which operate at
a frequency of 2.4 GHz under 802.11 wireless standards. The
BAN network and the NAN network connect various depart-
mental networks within a single building. In each network
type, there are smart meters that measure a building’s energy
production and the quantities consumed at different times.
Both BAN and NAN networks contain mining GPUs with a lot
of graphics memory in order to manage high hash rates as well
as low power draw (e.g., Nvidia GeForce GTX 1070, AMD
Radeon RX580, Nvidia GeForce GTX 1060...etc). All entities
of the smart grid use solar panels or wind generators, which
consolidates the energy infrastructure by creating additional
energy storage. This smart grid architecture provides a peer-to-
peer (P2P) energy trading mechanism, which each consumer
can use in order to sell or buy energy from neighboring nodes.
B. Short signatures
The short signatures scheme [22] is based on the following
algorithms: Setup (1λ): This algorithm generates a bilinear
environment (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e, ψ) based on the q-Strong
Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem. G1 and G2 are two groups
of prime order p with g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a
generator of G2, and ψ is an isomorphism where g1 = ψ(g2).
The system settings is defined as follows:
Sign_param = (λ, p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e, ψ) (1)
Key generation: Using the Sign_param, This algorithm
chooses randomly x and y in Z∗p and computes u = gx2 ∈ G2
and v = gy2 ∈ G2. The secret key is sk = (x, y) and the
corresponding public key is pk = (Sign_param, u, v, z) which
z = e(g1, g2) ∈ GT .
Sign phase: Using the secret key sk, the corresponding pub-
lic key pk, and the bloc B. This algorithm chooses randomly r
in Z∗p , which x+B+ yr , 0 mod p and computes the signature
as follows:
S = g
1
x+B+yt
1 (2)
Sending phase: Given the signature Sig = (S, r) of the bloc
B, the algorithm sends Sig.
Reception phase: The receiver checks the following formula
e
(
S, u, gB2 · vr
)
=? z (3)
C. Complexity assumptions
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (q-SDH) is defined
by Boneh and Boyen [23] as follows: given a (q + 2)-tuple
(g1, g2, gx2 , g(x
2)
2 , . . . , g
(xq )
2 ) as input where as above g1 = ψ(g2),
output a pair (c, g1/(x+c)1 ) where c ∈ Z∗p , g1 ∈ G1, and g2 ∈ G2.
An algorithm A has advantage  in solving q-SDH in (G1,G2)
if the probability
Pr
[
A
(
g1, g2, g
x
2 , g
(x2)
2 , . . . , g
(xq )
2
)
= (c, g1/(x+c)1 )
]
≥  (4)
IV. DEEPCOIN FRAMEWORK
This section overviews the architecture of the proposed
DeepCoin framework. It is composed of a blockchain-based
scheme and a Deep learning-based scheme. DeepCoin frame-
work consists of four network entities: Energy buyer, Energy
vendor, Blockchain, and IDS, which are described below.
• Energy buyer: We assume three types of energy buyers,
including, EBHAN , EBBAN , EBNAN , which are energy
network entities located in the HAN network, the BAN
network, and the NAN network, respectively. These enti-
ties plan to trade with energy vendors. An energy buyer
entity proves that he has enough energy money, named
CoinEnergy, that satisfy the energy vendor’s minimum
asset requirement.
• Energy vendor: We assume four types of energy vendors,
including, EVHAN , EVBAN , EVNAN , EVCOM which
are energy network entities located in the HAN network,
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BAN network, NAN network, and energy company, re-
spectively. These entities prove that they have enough
energy to sell to energy buyers entities (i.e., EBHAN ,
EBBAN , EBNAN ). Note that the energy company is an
entity that produces energy from renewable sources (e.g.,
solar energy, wind energy, and biomass).
• Blockchain: An entity which is a distributed digital ledger
containing all energy transactions in the smart grid. This
distributed ledger is replicated and stored in different
nodes of the smart grid, including, HANx , BANx , NANx ,
and COMx . The data structures of Blocks used by the
DeepCoin framework are presented in Fig. 2. Specifically,
the structure of each block includes nine fields. (1) Block
index field is a number that is unique for each block. (2)
Hash field is the hash value of the block content. (3)
Previous block field is the hash value of the previous
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which is sent to all honest nodes
Neighbor nodes and primary node are agreed on the order of the clientOs request. Then,
they send to all neighbor nodes and primary node, a message named VALIDATION.
All neighboring nodes and the primary node respond to both clients in order to reach
a consensus and publishes a full block
Fig. 3: The consensus process for blockchain-based energy
exchange framework.
block. (4) Transactions field containing the details of
the purchases made between energy buyers and energy
vendors. (5) Timestamp field is date and time of the
creation of the block. (6) CoinEnergy field is the money
of energy. (7) Size field is the size of the block. (8)
Merkle root field is the descendant of all the hashed
pairs in the tree. (9) Nonce field is the number that
blockchain miners are solving for. To add a block to the
blockchain, we assume that the BANx , NANx , and COMx
nodes mining new blocks, which is hard work, have to be
properly rewarded. Note that the data structures of Blocks
used by DeepCoin framework are inspired from Bitcoin’s
structure.
• Intrusion Detection System (IDS): An entity installed at
the BAN and NAN nodes, which is responsible for ver-
ifying that the frames running on the energy transaction
network comply with a set of rules. Specifically, this
entity detects the network attacks (e.g., brute force attack,
botnet, DoS attack, DDoS attack, web attack, infiltration
attack, ...etc) as well as fraudulent transactions to prevent
future illegal actions.
A. Blockchain-based scheme
In order to secure this energy environment, we propose a
blockchain based-energy scheme, where the nodes of the smart
grid network can exploit their excess energy and sell it to other
neighboring nodes (e.g., HAN) or neighbors on the other side
of the street (e.g., BAN, NAN). This scheme aims to strengthen
the local energy network and reduce the disruption caused by
dangerous situations such as natural disasters. In addition, this
scheme allows creating a secure and stable energy environment
at the grid edge.
Generally, there are two types of network consensus,
namely, 1) public network consensus and 2) private network
consensus [13]. To achieve consensus in a blockchain network,
there are five approaches, including, the practical Byzantine
fault tolerance (PBFT) algorithm, proof of work (proposed
by Nakamoto in the bitcoin network), proof of stake (used
by Ethereum), Proof of Authority (PoA), and RAFT. The
proposed DeepCoin framework uses the PBFT algorithm [24]
for achieving consensus in the smart grid. The overall message
complexity of PBFT’s normal operation is (O(N2)) [25].
Figure 3 shows the consensus process for blockchain-
based energy exchange framework. We assume that the smart
grid is composed of a set of four types of nodes N =
{HANx, BANx, NANx COMx}, where x = {1 . . . n}, con-
nected by a reliable peer-to-peer energy network. Therefore,
we propose that the total ledger is maintained by BANx ,
COMx , and NANx nodes while HANx nodes do not par-
ticipate in the consensus making. Our concrete DeepCoin
framework is outlined below:
• Setup phase: Based on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-
SDH) problem, let (G1,G2,GT ) be bilinear groups where
|G1 | = |G2 | = p for some prime p. Two different hash
functions are given: H1 : Θ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} and :
H2 : {0, 1} × {0, 1}∗ → Ω, which we assume that the
proposed scheme signs blocks in some finite set Ω and
5Algorithm 1 Consensus-making phase
Input: Px , EV , EB, σi , PKi , Bloci
Initialization: Set the time intervals of the block genera-
tion as t
Output: Success or Failure
1: Px checks the validity of the block using the following
formula: e
(
σi, u · gBloci2 , vri
)
=?z. If the equality is
true then Validity_Bloc = valid otherwise the result is
Validity_Bloc = invalid;
2: Px checks if the EV node has enough energy to sell. If the
equality is true then Validity_Energy = valid otherwise
the result is Validity_Energy = invalid;
3: Px checks if the EB node has enough CoinEnergy to
buy. If the equality is true then Validity_Coin = valid
otherwise the result is Validity_Coin = invalid;
4: if Validity_Bloc = invalid then
5: Px sends a penalty to the EB node;
6: return Failure;
7: else
8: if Validity_Energy = invalid then
9: Px sends a penalty to the EV node;
10: return Failure;
11: else
12: if Validity_Coin = invalid then
13: Px sends a penalty to the EB node;
14: return Failure;
15: else
16: Run the algorithm 2;
17: return Success;
18: end if
19: end if
20: end if
the secret keys are in some set Θ. The public key is
pk = (g1, g2, u, v, z). The corresponding secret key
is sk(x, y), and z = e(g1, g2) ∈ GT . The address set is
Si(pk i, sk i) [26].
• Agreement phase: When an energy buyer node EB
wants to buy energy from an energy vendor EV , they
negotiate the price, quantity, and period of validity. All
this information is contained in a file and embedded in
the blockchain block, as presented in Fig. 2.
• Creating a block: Given a secret key xi, yi∈ Z∗p and
a bloc Bloci∈ {0, 1}∗ , an energy buyer node EBi
picks a random number ri∈ Z∗p and compute σi =
H1
(
g
1
(xi+Bloci+yi+ri )
1
)
∈ {0, 1}. Then, the EBi compute
bi = H2 (σi, Bloci) ∈ Ω and set the time intervals of
block generation as T . The signature of bloc Bloci is
SigBloc(σi, bi, ri). At the end, the EBi broadcasts trans-
action data attached with SigBloc to the entire network.
• Consensus-making phase : This algorithm is an active
replication protocol and uses a special replica, named the
primary node (leader) P, that proposes a query execution
order. Generally, this algorithm requires N = 3 f + 1
replicas to tolerate f simultaneous Byzantine faults. In
Algorithm 2 Scheduling a bloc
Input: t, N = {HANx, BANx, NANx, COMx}, where
x = {1 . . . n}
Initialization: Set the time of the view as VIEW
Output: Reached or Not reached
1: Set VIEW = 0;
2: Px creates a message <PRE-PREPARE,Bloci, σi, Sec>,
with a unique sequence number Sec;
3: After the time t, the Px node sends <PRE-
PREPARE,Bloci, σi, Sec> to N;
4: After receiving the proposal, each node ∈ N replies with
a message <PREPARE, Bloci , Sec> to all N . the Px
and EB node do not participate in sending replies phase;
5: Each node ∈ N, upon receiving at least 2 f <PRE-
PREPARE,Bloci, σi, Sec> and <PREPARE, Bloci , Sec>,
sends a message <COMMIT, Bloci , Sec> to all N . the
EB node does not participate in this step;
6: Each node ∈ N, upon receiving at least 2 f +1 <COMMIT,
Bloci , Sec>, reaches a consensus and publishes a full
block and return Reached;
7: if the EB node does not receive a response after 2VIEW · t
then
8: run the algorithm 3 and return Not reached;
9: end if
Algorithm 3 View change phase
Input: t,VIEW , N = {HANx, BANx, NANx, COMx},
where x = {1 . . . n}
Initialization: Set the counter of the view as Counter = 1
1: VIEW=VIEW + Counter;
2: The EB node creates a message <CHANGE-
VIEW,Bloci, σi, Sec,VIEW>, with a unique sequence
number Sec;
3: The EB node sends <CHANGE-
VIEW,Bloci, σi, Sec,VIEW> to all N;
4: Choose a new Px node;
5: Run Algorithm 2;
6: if the EB node does not receive a response after 2VIEW · t
then
7: Counter = Counter + 1;
8: Back to Step 1;
9: end if
this phase, we propose that only the BANx , NANx , and
COMx can be one of the primary nodes Px in each
transaction. The choice of Px is based on the distance
of the transmission range. Once the primary node Px
receives a transaction from the EB node, Px run the
algorithm 1. After verifying the block, the primary node
Px creates a message, named PRE-PREPARE, in order
to propose to all nodes the scheduling of the bloc. The
honest nodes reply to PRE-PREPARE with a message,
named PREPARE, which is sent to all honest nodes.
When each node ∈ N, upon receiving at least 2 f PRE-
PREPARE and PREPARE, he sends a message, named
COMMIT, to all honest nodes. Then, when each node ∈
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N, upon receiving at least 2 f + 1 COMMIT, he reaches
a consensus and publishes a full block.
• View change phase : If the EB node does not receive a
response after a predefined period of time, it re-transmits
its request to all honest nodes by running the algorithm 3.
During the view change phase, from VIEW to VIEW+1,
the primary node of VIEW leaves its role of leader, and a
new primary node is elected as leader. The honest nodes
in this phase store the messages that they receive and send
to a log file. This allows to retransmit them if needed
(e.g., if a message is lost on the blockchain network).
Since the honest nodes can not store an infinite amount
of message, we propose that they truncate these messages
periodically.
In Figure 4, we compare the throughput of DeepCoin
framework with the state of the art of Byzantine fault tolerance
protocols in term of the different number of energy nodes.
Specifically, we have implemented six approaches, including,
Q/U, HQ, Zyzzyva, Aliph, WPN, and NFT. The Q/U protocol
was presented in 2005 by Abd-El-Malek et al. in [27] where
it involves a subset of replicas, called quorum, to order to
perform queries. The HQ protocol is proposed by Cowling et
al. in [28] which is based on a BFT protocol that requires 3 f+1
replicas. The Zyzzyva protocol [29] presented in 2009 by Kotla
et al., which is a BFT protocol and based on speculation (i.e.,
in the case without fault, the replicas do not need to agree
on the order of execution of the queries). The Aliph protocol
[30] combines three BFT protocols, namely, Quorum, Chain,
Backup. The WPN protocol uses the same consensus-making
phase of DeepCoin but the primary node is selected randomly.
The NFT protocol does not use a fault tolerance strategy for
transaction execution in the consensus protocol. From Figure
4, we can observe that the DeepCoin framework can validate
more transactions per minute than five approaches, including,
Q/U, HQ, Zyzzyva, Aliph, and WPN. The reason is that the
DeepCoin framework chooses BAN and NAN nodes with low
failure probabilities as primary nodes and the HAN nodes
cannot be selected as primary nodes.
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B. Deep learning-based scheme
In order to detect network attacks and fraudulent transac-
tions, we propose an intrusion detection system (IDS) based
on a deep learning approach. This approach is inspired by
recurrent neural networks. Note that the proposed IDS is
executed only by the BAN and NAN nodes in the blockchain-
based energy network.
There are many recurrent neural network (RNN) algorithms
proposed in the literature, such as, Real-Time Recurrent Learn-
ing (RTRL), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Echo-State
Networks (ESN), and Truncated Backpropagation Through
Time (TBTT) [31]. The RNN can extended deeper based on
three points defined by Pascanu et al. in [32], including, input-
to-hidden function, hidden-to-hidden transition, and hidden-to-
output function.
The standard RNN is a neural network that simulates
a discrete-time dynamical system, which is formalized as
follows: Given a sequence of input vectors x (t), a sequence
of output vectors is z (t), which t ∈ [1, t f ] and internal state
vectors are as follow: h0 (t) = x (t) , ∀ t ∈
[
1, t f
]
and h j (0) =
x (t) , ∀ j ∈ [1, N]. By applying the affine transformation aj to
the output vector of the previous layer and adding the linear
transformation Vj ∈ Rn j×n j , the parameters of an RNN can be
estimated by the following cost functions:
Aj (t) = Wj × h j−1 (t) + Vj × h j (t − 1) + bj (5)
h j(t) = δj(Aj(t)) (6)
7Algorithm 4 RNN using truncated BPTT algorithm
Input: x (t)
Initialization: h0 (t) = x (t) , ∀ t ∈
[
1, t f
]
Output: ∂C∂θ
1: for j = 1 to N do
2: for t = 1 to t f do
3: Aj(t) = Wvhx (t) +Whhht−1 + bj ;
4: h j(t) = e(Aj(t)) . e(·) is the hidden nonlinearities;
5: oj(t) = Whoh j(t) + bo;
6: z(t) = δ(oj(t)) . δ(·) is the output nonlinearities;
7: end for
8: Compute the loss of the RNN: L(z, y) = ∑t f
t=1 L(zt ; yt )
. L is loss function when predict y as z
9: end for
10: for N to j = 1 do
11: for t f to t = 1 do
12: ∂C∂o j (t) = δ′(oj(t)). ∂C∂L(z(t);y(t))/ ∂C∂z(t) ;
13: ∂C∂bo =
∂C
∂bo
+ oj(t);
14: ∂C∂Who =
∂C
∂Who
+ oj (t) hTj (t);
15: ∂C∂h j (t) = ∂C∂h j (t) +WTho ∂C∂o j (t);
16: ∂C∂z (t) = e′ (z(t)) · ∂C∂h j (t);
17: ∂C∂Wvh =
∂C
∂Wvh
+ ∂C∂z (t)x (t)T;
18: ∂C∂bh =
∂C
∂bh
+ ∂C∂z (t);
19: ∂C∂Whh =
∂C
∂Whh
+ ∂C∂z (t)hTj (t − 1);
20: ∂C∂h j (t − 1) = WThh ∂C∂z (t)
21: end for
22: end for
23: ∂C∂θ =
(
∂C
∂Whv
, ∂C∂Whh ,
∂C
∂Who
, ∂C∂bh ,
∂C
∂bo
, ∂C∂ho
)
;
24: return ∂C∂θ ;
Where h j (t), Aj (t) ∈ Rn j , and z (t)=h j(t).
The details of the proposed IDS methodology are illustrated
in Fig. 6. Specifically, the proposed method consists of four
stages: 1) datasets stage, 2) pre-processing stage, 3) training
stage and 4) testing stage. The detailed design of each stage
is further discussed in the following sub-sections.
1) Datasets stage: We use three different sources for the
experiments, the CICIDS2017 dataset [33], a Power System
dataset [34] and a Bot-IoT dataset [35].
The CICIDS2017 dataset is developed by Sharafaldin et al.
[33] at Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC). Compared
to the previous datasets (e.g., DARPA98, KDD99, and NSL-
KDD), the CICIDS2017 dataset contains benign and seven
common attack network flows, including, brute force attack,
heartbleed attack, botnet, DoS attack, DDoS attack, web
attack, infiltration attack.
The Power System dataset [34] is developed by Missis-
sippi State University and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Compared to the CICIDS2017 dataset, the Power System
dataset contains 37 scenarios, which are divided into 8 natural
events, 1 no events, and 28 attack events. Three categories
of attacks in power system are considered, including, 1) data
injection, 2) remote tripping command injection, and 3) relay
setting change. This dataset has been used for power system
cyber-attack classification (e.g., common path mining [36],
Fig. 6: Flowchart of the proposed IDS methodology.
sequential pattern mining approach [37])
The CICDS2017 and the Power System dataset lack the
inclusion of IoT-generated traffic. In order to evaluate the
performance of DeepCoin framework in IoT-generated traffic
(e.g., the Internet of Energy (IoE)), we use another dataset,
named Bot-IoT dataset. The Bot-IoT dataset is developed by
Koroniotis et al. [35] at the University of New South Wales
Canberra. The attacks in the Bot-IoT dataset are categorized
into three attack types: information gathering, DoS, and infor-
mation theft.
We assume that the smart grid is divided into two com-
pletely separated networks, namely, victim-smart grid and
attack-smart grid. The victim-smart grid contains the necessary
equipment for building a smart grid communication, including,
smart meters, routers, firewalls, switches...etc. To launch a
brute force attack, an adversary uses a Python script, named
Patator, which contains 30 modules (e.g., SMTP raw force,
Raw force to HTTP, SSH raw force...etc). The DoS attack can
be launched in the smart grid by four tools, namely, Hulk,
GoldenEye, Slowloris, and Slowhttptest, in order to target the
blockchain web hosting. A web attack can be launched using a
PHP/MySQL web application, entitled Damn Vulnerable Web
Application (DVWA), in order to hack a neighbor’s smart
meter. The infiltration attack can be launched by the Metasploit
tool to develop and execute exploits against the victim-smart
grid. Specifically, the attack-smart grid uses three modules,
namely, 1) Exploit module, which is used to exploit a vulner-
ability on the victim-smart grid, 2) Payload module, which is
used for opening a port on the victim-smart grid connected
to a shell or opening a virtual network computing session,
and 3) Auxiliary modules, which are used for various tasks
(e.g., execute the Nmap and portscan). To change power flows
on the lines in the victim-smart grid, an adversary’s botnet
8disrupt the power grid’s normal operation using different tools
for Botnet attacks, such as Ares. In addition, an adversary
can launch a DDoS attack and PortScan in the AMI network
environment using the LOIC tool (e.g., sending the UDP, TCP,
or HTTP requests to the victim-smart grid), in order to deplete
the resources, deteriorate the performance of packet delivery,
and drop an amount of the legitimate packets of the victim-
smart grid. For detail explanation of other attacks in Smart
Grid, we refer the readers to [3].
2) Pre-processing stage: The CSV version of CICIDS 2017
contains 2,830,743 rows devised on 8 files, containing 79
features for every traffic record. The CSV version of Power
System dataset contains 78404 rows devised on 15 files with
128 features for every traffic record. The CSV version of Bot-
IoT dataset contains 73,360,900 rows with 32 features for
every traffic record. For each dataset, we concatenate the files
in one same table that contains all benign and attacks rows.
Then, we create a training and test subset for each data set.
3) Normalization stage: In order to help the DeepCoin
framework to converge and achieve its objectives we per-
formed scaling of the data into a specific range [0,1] using
the Min-Max transformation :
xi( j) = xi( j) − Min(x( j))Max(x( j)) − Min(x( j)) (7)
Where Max denotes the maximum value and Min denotes
minimum value from the original set for each value xi of the
feature j.
4) Training stage: For training an RNN, we use the trun-
cated BPTT algorithm. Refer to Fig. 5, BPTT defined by
Werbos [38] and Learning representations by back-propagating
errors defined by Rumelhart et al. [39], the RNN using
truncated BPTT algorithm is described in an Algorithmic way
in 4.
5) Testing stage: In order to test the proposed RNN-IDS
model, we process each row of the test data set by the training
RNN using truncated backpropagation. Then, we classify the
result rows as Benign or a specific type of attack, as presented
in Fig 6.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. Evaluation settings
Table I summarizes the statistics of attacks in Training and
Test datasets, including, CICIDS2017 dataset [33], Bot-IoT
dataset [35], and Power System dataset [34]. The experiment
is performed on Google Colaboratory1 under python 3 using
TensorFlow library and three types of hardware accelerators,
including, Central Processing Unit (CPU), Graphics Process-
ing Unit (GPU), and Tensor Processing Unit (TPU). We used
four packages, NumPy, Pandas, Scikit-learn and Keras. The
NumPy is used for manipulating multidimensional arrays as
well as mathematical functions operating. The Pandas library
is used for manipulating and analyzing data. The Scikit-learn
library and Keras library are used for deep neural network
algorithms and machine learning. Finally, we compare the
1https://colab.research.google.com
TABLE I: Statistics of attacks in Training and Test datasets
Dataset Attack Flow Count Training Test
CICIDS
dataset
BENIGN BENIGN 2273097 30000 30000
DoS
DDoS 128027 3700 4300
Heartbleed 11 5 5
DoS
slowloris 5796 2350 2650
DoS
GoldenEye 10293 2300 1700
DoS Hulk 231073 5500 6500
DoS
Slowhttptest 5499 2161 1159
Web Attack
Web Attack
Sql Injection 21 15 5
Web Attack
Brute Force 1507 920 480
Web Attack
XSS 652 480 160
Infiltration Infiltration 36 20 10
PortScan PortScan 158930 3800 4200
Brute-Force FTP-Patator 7938 910 1090SSH-Patator 5897 910 1090
Bot Bot 1966 930 630
Bot-IoT
dataset
BENIGN BENIGN 9543 4000 4000
Information
gathering
Service
scanning 1463364 36700 36468
OS
Fingerprinting 358275 9002 8911
DoS
DDoS TCP 19547603 498602 478778
DDoS UDP 18965106 484127 464128
DDoS HTTP 19771 594 394
DoS TCP 12315997 317899 297900
DoS UDP 20659491 526487 506487
DoS HTTP 29706 942 543
Information
theft
Keylogging 1469 106 98
Data theft 118 102 96
Power
System
dataset
Natural
Events
Natural
Events 1221 500 500
Attack Attack 3711 2010 890
No event No event 294 208 92
TABLE II: Accuracy of the proposed IDS using the CI-
CDS2017 dataset with different hardware accelerators and
hidden nodes.
Accuracy Training time (s) Test time (s)CPU GPU TPU CPU GPU TPU
HN = 10 96.776% 110.4 15.2 13.1 2.15 1.21 1.20
HN = 20 97.116% 313.1 30.3 27.6 7.33 3.82 3.22
HN = 30 98.349% 824.2 55.7 51.6 15.45 6.57 6.52
HN = 40 98.444% 921.3 78.1 62.2 33.22 16.22 16.13
HN = 50 98.941% 1002.4 95.2 73.3 41.61 31.27 29.31
HN = 60 99.811% 1772.9 155.9 102.2 123.98 72.35 71.39
HN: Hidden nodes. Number of epochs = 5. The batch size=100.
TABLE III: Accuracy of the proposed IDS using the Bot-IoT
dataset with different hardware accelerators and hidden nodes.
Accuracy Training time (s) Test time (s)CPU GPU TPU CPU GPU TPU
HN = 10 97.177% 300.1 60.3 55.2 14.32 8.24 7.88
HN = 20 97.336% 500.4 79.1 71.6 21.87 12.77 11.83
HN = 30 97.809% 991.2 92.7 85.9 34.24 18.23 17.82
HN = 40 98.114% 1010.2 103.2 92.5 67.23 21.13 20.12
HN = 50 98.881% 1200.8 140.4 133.8 70.65 27.14 26.18
HN = 60 99.912% 2012.9 201.7 191.6 90.11 44.23 43.12
HN: Hidden nodes. Number of epochs = 5. The batch size=100.
TABLE IV: Accuracy of the proposed IDS using the Power
System dataset with different hardware accelerators and hidden
nodes.
Accuracy Training time (s) Test time (s)CPU GPU TPU CPU GPU TPU
HN = 10 96.127% 20.2 2.3 2.1 21.31 1.13 1.01
HN = 20 96.341% 33.6 4.1 4.3 18.02 2.12 2.03
HN = 30 96.451% 54.2 6.7 6.3 15.24 2.22 2.11
HN = 40 96.684% 87.2 13.4 13.1 22.14 2.88 2.56
HN = 50 96.742% 94.6 16.5 16.2 25.77 4.14 4.03
HN = 60 96.822% 132.2 20.7 21.4 30.16 7.21 7.22
HN: Hidden nodes. Number of epochs = 5. The batch size=100.
9TABLE V: Performance comparison with other models in
terms of detection rate under multi-class classification.
Proposed IDS SVM RF NB
DDoS 99.899% 98.988% 98.719% 65.656%
Heartbleed 100% 100% 100% 85.000%
DoS slowloris 98.111% 91.258% 92.647% 81.556%
DoS GoldenEye 77.122% 69.252% 65.462% 63.255%
DoS Hulk 97.793% 96.275% 94.043% 72.661%
DoS Slowhttptes 94.104% 88.229% 80.041% 71.172%
Sql Injection 80.000% 70.000% 100% 100%
Brute Force 82.376% 81.487% 81.517% 59.512%
XSS 91.715% 87.612% 38.687% 90.875%
Infiltration 100% 84.296% 82.129% 82.429%
PortScan 98.995% 97.884% 99.763% 98.388%
FTP-Patator 99.747% 97.249% 98.616% 98.344%
SSH-Patator 99.923% 96.643% 97.128% 98.291%
Bot 97.585% 69.699% 98.567% 30.987%
Service scanning 87.912% 72.823% 69.823% 65.212%
OS Fingerprinting 92.218% 70.139% 82.198% 68.675%
DDoS TCP 100% 89.564% 88.281% 78.669%
DDoS UDP 100% 98.138% 55.258% 78.500%
DDoS HTTP 100% 62.239% 82.257% 50.775%
DoS TCP 100% 71.255% 81.771% 65.555%
DoS UDP 100% 100% 82.988% 100%
DoS HTTP 100% 70.139% 82.198% 68.675%
Keylogging 77.909% 65.123% 70.119% 65.618%
Data theft 99.749% 89.668% 86.551% 66.546%
Power Attack 98.876% 82.366% 81.556% 82.277%
SVM: Support Vector Machine. RF: Random Forest. NB: Naive Bayes.
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison with other models in terms
of false alarm rate.
performance of the IDS model with three machine learning
methods, including, Support Vector Machine, Random Forest,
and Naive Bayes.
In order to evaluate the performance of our energy
blockchain network, we have created a private blockchain us-
ing MultiChain2, which is an open source blockchain platform.
We consider that the energy blockchain network contains three
types of nodes, HAN = {30, 40, 60}, BAN = {5, 10, 15} and
NAN = {5, 10, 15}. In addition, we assume that an attacker
A uses Sybil attack to launch two types of attacks, a selfish
2https://www.multichain.com/
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Fig. 8: The detection rate of attacks in energy blockchain
network varies with the number of attackers and HAN =
{30, 40, 60}, BAN = {5, 10, 15}, and NAN = {5, 10, 15}.
These attackers launch two types of attacks against the energy
blockchain network, a selfish mining attack and a double
spending attack.
mining attack and a double spending attack. Both honest nodes
and attackers have 30% of the hashing power in the beginning.
B. Evaluation metrics
In order to measure the performance of the proposed IDS
model, we use the most important performance indicators,
accuracy, detection rate (DR), and false alarm rate (FAR),
which are defined below:
Accuracy =
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
(8)
Detection rate =
TP
TP + FN
(9)
False alarm rate =
FP
FP + TN
(10)
The accuracy measures the proportion of the total number
of correct classifications. The detection rate measures the
proportion of detection of an attack. The false alarm measures
the proportion of benign events incorrectly classified as attacks
[56]. However, these measures are based on four metrics, True
Positive (TP), False Negative (FN), True Negative (TN) and
False Positive (FP). TP is equivalent to attack data that are
correctly classified as an attack. FN is equivalent to attack
data that are incorrectly classified as normal. TN represents
normal data that are correctly classified as normal. The FP
means normal data that are incorrectly classified as an attack.
C. Evaluation results
Accuracy of the proposed IDS using the CICIDS2017
dataset with different hardware accelerators (i.e., CPU, GPU,
TPU) and hidden nodes HN = {10, 20, 30, 40, 60} is shown in
Table II. Due to the high-performance of GPU and TPU with
hundreds of cores, both training time and test time are fast
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TABLE VI: Performance comparison with other Intrusion detection systems that are based on deep learning
Framework Year Data set
Classification
method Blockchain
Capacity for
feature diversity
Machine learning
library CPU GPU TPU Accuracy
Gao et al. [40] 2014 KDD Cup 1999 DBN No Low MATLAB 7.0 Yes No No N/A
Alom et al. [41] 2015 NSL-KDD DBN No Low N/A N/A N/A N/A 97.50%
Tang et al. [42] 2016 NSL-KDD DNN No Low N/A N/A N/A N/A 75.75%
Niyaz et al. [43] 2016 NSL-KDD STL No Low N/A N/A N/A N/A 79.10%
Kim et al. [44] 2016 KDD Cup 1999 RNN using LSTM No Low N/A Yes Yes No 96.93%
Yin et al. [45] 2017 NSL-KDD RNN using FPBP No Low Theano Yes No No 81.29%
Shone et al. [46] 2018 KDD Cup 1999 NDAE No Low TensorFlow Yes Yes No 97.85%NSL-KDD Low 89.22%
Tang et al. [47] 2018 NSL-KDD RNN using GRU No Low Keras Yes No No 89%
Diro et al. [48] 2018 NSL-KDD Deep model No Low N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Jiang et al. [49] 2018 NSL-KDD RNN using LSTM No Low TensorFlow Yes Yes No 97%
Zhou et al. [20] 2018 N/A DNN No Low TensorFlow N/A N/A N/A 96.31%
Yang et al. [50] 2019 NSL-KDD MDPCA with DBN No Low TensorFlow Yes No No 82.08%UNSW-NB15 Medium 90.21%
Zhang et al. [51] 2019 KDD Cup 1999 DGNN No Low N/A Yes Yes No 93.93%
Basumallik et al. [52] 2019 IEEE-30 bus CNN No Medium Keras Yes No No 98.67%IEEE-118 bus Medium 94.53%
DeepCoin /
CICIDS2017
RNN using BPTT Yes
High
TensorFlow Yes Yes Yes
98.23%
Bot-IoT High 98.20%
Power System Medium 96.52%
Abbreviation & Terms. N/A: means no available results, NSL-KDD: Data set contains four attacks (DoS,U2R,R2L,Probe), STL: Self-taught Learning, RNN: Recurrent Neural
Network, FPBP: Forward propagation and back propagation, LSTM: Long short term memory, BPTT: Truncated back propagation through time, GRU: Gated recurrent unit, DBN:
Deep belief neural, KDD Cup 1999: Data set contains four attacks (DoS,U2R,R2L,Probe), CPU: Central processing unit, GPU: Graphics processing unit, TPU: Tensor processing
unit, NDAE: an auto-encoder featuring non-symmetrical multiple hidden layers, DNN: Deep neural network, MDPCA: Modified density peak clustering algorithm. UNSW-NB15:
Data set contains nine attacks (Generic, Exploits, Fuzzers, DoS, Reconnaissance, Analysis, Backdoor, Shellcode, and Worms), DGNN: Deep generative neural network, CNN :
Convolutional neural network, IEEE-30 bus and IEEE-118 bus systems contain six attacks (Bus/Branch faults, Line Trip, Load Changes, Generation Changes, Shunt
Disconnection, and False Data).
TABLE VII: Comparison between DeepCoin and other related
frameworks in the non-blockchain systems
Metric [53] [19] [54] [20] [55] DeepCoin
Ledger distribution N N N N N Y
Fault tolerance N N N N N Y
Participation in consensus N N N N N Y
Smart contracts N N N N N Y
Intrusion detection system N Y N Y N Y
Adaptability P P P P P Y
Security Y P Y P Y Y
Privacy Y N Y N Y Y
Trust P N P N P Y
Reduced maintenance cost N N N N N Y
Internet of Energy (IoE)
e-business model N N N N N Y
Abbreviation & Terms. Y: Yes; P: Partial; N: No.
TABLE VIII: Comparison between DeepCoin and other re-
lated frameworks in the blockchain systems
Metric [11] [14] [15] [16] [17] DeepCoin
Ledger distribution Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fault tolerance P P Y P P Y
Participation in consensus Y Y Y Y Y Y
Smart contracts Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intrusion detection system N N N N N Y
Adaptability Y Y P Y Y Y
Security Y Y Y Y Y Y
Privacy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Trust Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reduced maintenance cost P P Y Y Y Y
Internet of Energy (IoE)
e-business model Y Y Y Y Y Y
Abbreviation & Terms. Y: Yes; P: Partial; N: No.
compared to the performance with a CPU. The accuracy of
the proposed IDS increases when the number of hidden nodes
increases; the better accuracy is 99.811% which is achieved
with 60% hidden nodes.
Accuracy of the proposed IDS using the Bot-IoT dataset
with different hardware accelerators (i.e., CPU, GPU, TPU)
and hidden nodes HN = {10, 20, 30, 40, 60} is depicted in
Table III. For the case of HN = 10, the results show that
for both the number of epochs = 5 and the batch size = 100,
the accuracy is 97.177%.
Accuracy of the proposed IDS using the Power System
dataset with different hardware accelerators (i.e., CPU, GPU,
TPU) and hidden nodes HN = {10, 20, 30, 40, 60} is shown
in Table IV. For the case of HN = 60, the results show that
for both the number of epochs = 5 and the batch size = 100,
the accuracy is 96.822%. In addition, the results show that
the performance does not improve with the number of hidden
nodes. This is because the Power System dataset does not
contain many attacks compared to both the CICIDS2017
dataset and the Bot-IoT dataset. It is concluded that the
proposed IDS is efficient and shows higher performance with
datasets that contain many types of attacks.
Table V demonstrates the performance comparison of the
proposed IDS against other classifiers, including, SVM, RF,
and NB, in terms of detection rate under multi-class classi-
fication. According to the results, the detection rate for each
attack obtained by our proposed IDS is higher compared to the
detection rate obtained by SVM, RF, and NB. In addition, the
proposed IDS reaches a 100% detection rate for eight attacks,
including, Heartbleed, Infiltration, DDoS TCP, DDoS UDP,
DDoS HTTP, DoS TCP, DoS UDP, and DoS HTTP.
Figure 7 shows the performance comparison of proposed
IDS with other models, including, SVM, RF, and NB, in terms
of false alarm rate under three datasets. Mean false alarm
rate of the proposed IDS is 0.986% in CICIDS2017 dataset,
1.281% in Bot-IoT dataset, and 3.986% in Power System
dataset, which are better than those obtained using SVM, RF,
and NB.
Figure 8 shows the detection rate of attacks in energy
blockchain network varies with the number of attackers at
HAN = {30, 40, 60}, BAN = {5, 10, 15}, and NAN =
{5, 10, 15}. The DeepCoin framework gets a higher detection
rate of attacks (i.e., selfish mining attack and double spending
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attack) when there are 5 attackers, HAN = {30}, BAN = {5},
and NAN = {5}. The detection rate decreases when the
number of attackers is greater than 50% of the total computing
power of the entire blockchain (i.e., total number of BAN and
NAN nodes).
D. Comparison between DeepCoin and other related frame-
works
Table VI shows the performance of DeepCoin framework
compared with the Deep learning based intrusion detection
systems, that have been previously proposed. In the machine
learning, there is a parameter, named hyperparameter, which
value is set before the learning process begins. The deep
learning-based IDS systems use two types of hyperparameters,
namely, 1) hyperparameters related to the network structure
and 2) hyperparameters related to training algorithm. The
hyperparameters related to the network structure include the
number of hidden layers and the weight initialization schemes
(i.e., Sigmoid, Softmax). The hyperparameters related to train-
ing algorithm include learning rate, number of epochs, and
batch size. Gao et al. [40] and Alom et al. [41] proposed
IDS systems based on Deep belief networks, which the pre-
training is modeled using the restricted Boltzmann machine.
Niyaz et al. Niyaz et al. [43] used self-taught learning (STL)
as a deep learning approach. The STL technique consists
of two stages for the classification, including, 1) feature
representation is learned from a large collection of unlabeled
data and 2) apply the first stage to labeled data for the
classification task. The recurrent neural network algorithms
are used by IDS models, such as long short-term memory
(LSTM) [44], [49], forward propagation and back propagation
(FPBP) [45], and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [47]. Therefore,
many existing IDS systems utilize three datasets, including,
KDD Cup 1999 dataset, NSL-KDD dataset, and UNSW-NB15
dataset, which are outdated and of very limited practical value
for a modern IDS. The DeepCoin framework is evaluated
in moderns datasets, such as the CICIDS2017 dataset and
the Bot-IoT dataset. In addition, there is only the DeepCoin
framework that combines blockchain technology with the
deep learning approach using a truncated BPTT algorithm for
intrusion detection.
The comparisons between DeepCoin and other related
frameworks in both non-blockchain systems and blockchain
systems are presented in Table VII and Table VIII, respec-
tively. The first metric considered is ledger distribution and
this refers to the ability of replication and saving an iden-
tical copy of the ledger by each energy node in the smart
grid. The next metric considered is fault tolerance and this
refers to the ability to identify failures through distributed
consensus protocols. The proposed DeepCoin framework uses
the practical Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm for achieving
consensus in the smart grid. Intrusion detection was also
considered which refers to the ability to detect network attacks
and fraudulent transactions. DeepCoin provides this property
and makes it infeasible to change or modify energy data in
the smart grid based on a deep learning approach. Security,
privacy, and trust, which are the most important challenges
faced by the smart grid, was also considered. The DeepCoin
framework coupled with short signatures and hash functions
ensures these properties. The blockchain technology enables
trust between transacting energy nodes (i.e., removing the need
for energy nodes to trust centralized entities to handle their
energy data). In addition, DeepCoin provides an Internet of
Energy (IoE) e-business model, by incentivizing users to make
energy available for others to use on demand, in exchange for
cryptocurrency.
E. Privacy analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the security properties of
our proposed DeepCoin framework by focusing on privacy
preservation.
Let A be an adversary attacking the proposed DeepCoin
framework under strong existential unforgeability game. The
result in [22] has shown that the short signatures scheme is
existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message
attack and is data private, based on the q-SDH assumption
holds in (G1,G2). In the proposed DeepCoin framework, on
one hand, the transaction data SigBloc(σi, bi, ri) is protected
by a hash function and a validated certificate. On other
hand, by using σi in SigBloc, both energy buyer node EBi
and energy vendor node EV j can easily check whether two
signatures on the same packet are generated by the same signer
or not. In addition, the blockchain combined with the short
signatures scheme and hash function ensures that an adversary
cannot pose as the energy buyer node or energy vendor node.
Hence, the proposed DeepCoin framework satisfies privacy-
preservation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel deep learning
and blockchain-based energy framework, called DeepCoin, for
Smart Grids. Based on short signatures and hash functions, in
DeepCoin, users can exploit the excess energy and sell it to
other neighboring users while preserving privacy. With the use
of the practical Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm, DeepCoin
can achieve consensus inside the blockchain-based energy
network. DeepCoin includes a novel Deep learning-based
scheme using a recurrent neural network algorithm. Through
performance evaluations using three datasets we demonstrated
the efficiency of the proposed DeepCoin framework.
For future work, we plan to study the performance of the
DeepCoin framework with the integration of edge computing
[57], [58] in the smart grid. We will consider an edge com-
puting enabled blockchain network in the smart grid, where
energy nodes can access and utilize computing services from
an edge computing service provider. This integration may help
the energy nodes achieve optimal energy management policy.
REFERENCES
[1] “Energy consumption in the uk,” https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistics/energy-consumption-in-the-uk, accessed: 2018-01-24.
[2] “Us energy information administration, us department of en-
ergy,” https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity_
in_the_united_states, accessed: 2018-01-24.
12
[3] M. A. Ferrag, L. A. Maglaras, H. Janicke, J. Jiang, and L. Shu, “A
systematic review of data protection and privacy preservation schemes
for smart grid communications,” Sustainable Cities and Society, vol. 38,
pp. 806–835, 2018.
[4] S. Tan, D. De, W.-Z. Song, J. Yang, and S. K. Das, “Survey of security
advances in smart grid: A data driven approach,” IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 397–422, 2017.
[5] P. Srikantha and D. Kundur, “A der attack-mitigation differential game
for smart grid security analysis.” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 3,
pp. 1476–1485, 2016.
[6] M. A. Ferrag, “Epec: an efficient privacy-preserving energy consumption
scheme for smart grid communications,” Telecommunication Systems,
vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 671–688, 2017.
[7] R. Yang, F. R. Yu, P. Si, Z. Yang, and Y. Zhang, “Integrated blockchain
and edge computing systems: A survey, some research issues and
challenges,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2019.
[8] “The essential eight technologies board byte: blockchain,” https://www.
pwc.com.au/pdf/essential-8-emerging-technologies-blockchain.pdf. last
accessed 30 Apr. 2019.
[9] C. Pop, T. Cioara, M. Antal, I. Anghel, I. Salomie, and M. Bertoncini,
“Blockchain based decentralized management of demand response pro-
grams in smart energy grids,” Sensors, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 162, 2018.
[10] N. Z. Aitzhan and D. Svetinovic, “Security and privacy in decentralized
energy trading through multi-signatures, blockchain and anonymous
messaging streams,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 840–852, 2018.
[11] Z. Li, J. Kang, R. Yu, D. Ye, Q. Deng, and Y. Zhang, “Consortium
blockchain for secure energy trading in industrial internet of things,”
IEEE transactions on industrial informatics, vol. 14, no. 8, pp. 3690–
3700, 2018.
[12] Z. Guan, G. Si, X. Zhang, L. Wu, N. Guizani, X. Du, and Y. Ma,
“Privacy-preserving and efficient aggregation based on blockchain for
power grid communications in smart communities,” IEEE Communica-
tions Magazine, vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 82–88, 2018.
[13] M. A. Ferrag, M. Derdour, M. Mukherjee, A. Derhab, L. Maglaras, and
H. Janicke, “Blockchain technologies for the internet of things: Research
issues and challenges,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2018.
[14] J. Gao, K. O. Asamoah, E. B. Sifah, A. Smahi, Q. Xia, H. Xia, X. Zhang,
and G. Dong, “Gridmonitoring: Secured sovereign blockchain based
monitoring on smart grid,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 9917–9925, 2018.
[15] M. Fan and X. Zhang, “Consortium blockchain based data aggregation
and regulation mechanism for smart grid,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp.
35 929–35 940, 2019.
[16] K. Gai, Y. Wu, L. Zhu, M. Qiu, and M. Shen, “Privacy-preserving energy
trading using consortium blockchain in smart grid,” IEEE Transactions
on Industrial Informatics, 2019.
[17] K. Gai, Y. Wu, L. Zhu, L. Xu, and Y. Zhang, “Permissioned blockchain
and edge computing empowered privacy-preserving smart grid net-
works,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2019.
[18] M. A. Faisal, Z. Aung, J. R. Williams, A. Sanchez et al., “Data-stream-
based intrusion detection system for advanced metering infrastructure in
smart grid: A feasibility study.” IEEE Systems journal, vol. 9, no. 1, pp.
31–44, 2015.
[19] P. Jokar and V. C. Leung, “Intrusion detection and prevention for zigbee-
based home area networks in smart grids,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 1800–1811, 2018.
[20] L. Zhou, X. Ouyang, H. Ying, L. Han, Y. Cheng, and T. Zhang,
“Cyber-attack classification in smart grid via deep neural network,” in
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Computer Science
and Application Engineering. ACM, 2018, p. 90.
[21] C. H. Liu, Q. Lin, and S. Wen, “Blockchain-enabled data collection
and sharing for industrial iot with deep reinforcement learning,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, pp. 1–1, 2018.
[22] D. Boneh and X. Boyen, “Short signatures without random oracles and
the sdh assumption in bilinear groups,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 21,
no. 2, pp. 149–177, 2008.
[23] ——, “Short signatures without random oracles,” in International Con-
ference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques.
Springer, 2004, pp. 56–73.
[24] M. Castro and B. Liskov, “Practical byzantine fault tolerance,” in OSDI,
vol. 99, 1999, pp. 173–186.
[25] Y. Xiao, N. Zhang, J. Li, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “Distributed consensus
protocols and algorithms,” Blockchain for Distributed Systems Security,
p. 25, 2019.
[26] M. A. Ferrag and A. Ahmim, “Esspr: an efficient secure routing
scheme based on searchable encryption with vehicle proxy re-encryption
for vehicular peer-to-peer social network,” Telecommunication Systems,
vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 481–503, 2017.
[27] M. Abd-El-Malek, G. R. Ganger, G. R. Goodson, M. K. Reiter, and J. J.
Wylie, “Fault-scalable byzantine fault-tolerant services,” ACM SIGOPS
Operating Systems Review, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 59–74, 2005.
[28] J. Cowling, D. Myers, B. Liskov, R. Rodrigues, and L. Shrira, “Hq
replication: A hybrid quorum protocol for byzantine fault tolerance,”
in Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and
implementation. USENIX Association, 2006, pp. 177–190.
[29] R. Kotla, L. Alvisi, M. Dahlin, A. Clement, and E. Wong, “Zyzzyva:
Speculative byzantine fault tolerance,” ACM Transactions on Computer
Systems (TOCS), vol. 27, no. 4, p. 7, 2009.
[30] R. Guerraoui, N. Kneževic´, V. Quéma, and M. Vukolic´, “The next
700 bft protocols,” in Proceedings of the 5th European conference on
Computer systems. ACM, 2010, pp. 363–376.
[31] I. Sutskever, Training recurrent neural networks. University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2013.
[32] R. Pascanu, C. Gulcehre, K. Cho, and Y. Bengio, “How to construct
deep recurrent neural networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6026, 2013.
[33] I. Sharafaldin, A. H. Lashkari, and A. A. Ghorbani, “Toward generating
a new intrusion detection dataset and intrusion traffic characterization.”
in ICISSP, 2018, pp. 108–116.
[34] U. Adhikari, S. Pan, T. Morris, R. Borges, and J. Beave, “Industrial
control system (ICS) cyber attack datasets,” https://sites.google.com/a/
uah.edu/tommy-morris-uah/ics-data-sets. last accessed 02 Jan. 2019.
[35] N. Koroniotis, N. Moustafa, E. Sitnikova, and B. Turnbull, “To-
wards the development of realistic botnet dataset in the internet of
things for network forensic analytics: Bot-iot dataset,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.00701, 2018.
[36] S. Pan, T. Morris, and U. Adhikari, “Developing a hybrid intrusion de-
tection system using data mining for power systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 3104–3113, 2015.
[37] ——, “Classification of disturbances and cyber-attacks in power systems
using heterogeneous time-synchronized data,” IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Informatics, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 650–662, 2015.
[38] P. J. Werbos, “Backpropagation through time: what it does and how to
do it,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 78, no. 10, pp. 1550–1560, 1990.
[39] D. E. Rumelhart, G. E. Hinton, and R. J. Williams, “Learning represen-
tations by back-propagating errors,” nature, vol. 323, no. 6088, p. 533,
1986.
[40] N. Gao, L. Gao, Q. Gao, and H. Wang, “An intrusion detection model
based on deep belief networks,” in Advanced Cloud and Big Data
(CBD), 2014 Second International Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp.
247–252.
[41] M. Z. Alom, V. Bontupalli, and T. M. Taha, “Intrusion detection
using deep belief networks,” in Aerospace and Electronics Conference
(NAECON), 2015 National. IEEE, 2015, pp. 339–344.
[42] T. A. Tang, L. Mhamdi, D. McLernon, S. A. R. Zaidi, and M. Ghogho,
“Deep learning approach for network intrusion detection in software
defined networking,” in Wireless Networks and Mobile Communications
(WINCOM), 2016 International Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 258–
263.
[43] A. Javaid, Q. Niyaz, W. Sun, and M. Alam, “A deep learning approach
for network intrusion detection system,” in Proceedings of the 9th
EAI International Conference on Bio-inspired Information and Com-
munications Technologies (formerly BIONETICS). ICST (Institute for
Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and âA˘e˛, 2016, pp. 21–26.
[44] J. Kim, J. Kim, H. L. T. Thu, and H. Kim, “Long short term memory
recurrent neural network classifier for intrusion detection,” in Platform
Technology and Service (PlatCon), 2016 International Conference on.
IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–5.
[45] C. Yin, Y. Zhu, J. Fei, and X. He, “A deep learning approach for intrusion
detection using recurrent neural networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp.
21 954–21 961, 2017.
[46] N. Shone, T. N. Ngoc, V. D. Phai, and Q. Shi, “A deep learning approach
to network intrusion detection,” IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics
in Computational Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 41–50, 2018.
[47] T. A. Tang, L. Mhamdi, D. McLernon, S. A. R. Zaidi, and M. Ghogho,
“Deep recurrent neural network for intrusion detection in sdn-based
networks,” in 2018 4th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization
and Workshops (NetSoft). IEEE, 2018, pp. 202–206.
[48] A. A. Diro and N. Chilamkurti, “Distributed attack detection scheme
using deep learning approach for internet of things,” Future Generation
Computer Systems, vol. 82, pp. 761–768, 2018.
[49] F. Jiang, Y. Fu, B. B. Gupta, F. Lou, S. Rho, F. Meng, and Z. Tian,
“Deep learning based multi-channel intelligent attack detection for data
security,” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing, 2018.
13
[50] Y. Yang, K. Zheng, C. Wu, X. Niu, and Y. Yang, “Building an effective
intrusion detection system using the modified density peak clustering
algorithm and deep belief networks,” Applied Sciences, vol. 9, no. 2, p.
238, 2019.
[51] H. Zhang, X. Yu, P. Ren, C. Luo, and G. Min, “Deep adversarial learning
in intrusion detection: A data augmentation enhanced framework,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1901.07949, 2019.
[52] S. Basumallik, R. Ma, and S. Eftekharnejad, “Packet-data anomaly
detection in pmu-based state estimator using convolutional neural net-
work,” International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol.
107, pp. 690–702, 2019.
[53] R. Lu, X. Liang, X. Li, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Eppa: An efficient
and privacy-preserving aggregation scheme for secure smart grid com-
munications,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 1621–1631, 2012.
[54] H. Li, X. Lin, H. Yang, X. Liang, R. Lu, and X. Shen, “Eppdr: An
efficient privacy-preserving demand response scheme with adaptive key
evolution in smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 2053–2064, 2014.
[55] Y. Liu, W. Guo, C.-I. Fan, L. Chang, and C. Cheng, “A practical
privacy-preserving data aggregation (3pda) scheme for smart grid,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 1767–1774,
2019.
[56] A. L. Buczak and E. Guven, “A survey of data mining and machine
learning methods for cyber security intrusion detection,” IEEE Commu-
nications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1153–1176, 2016.
[57] Z. Xiong, Y. Zhang, D. Niyato, P. Wang, and Z. Han, “When mobile
blockchain meets edge computing,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 33–39, 2018.
[58] M. Mukherjee, R. Matam, L. Shu, L. Maglaras, M. A. Ferrag, N. Choud-
hury, and V. Kumar, “Security and privacy in fog computing: Chal-
lenges,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 19 293–19 304, 2017.
Mohamed Amine Ferrag received the bachelor’s,
master’s, and Ph.D. degrees from Badji Mokhtar
- Annaba University, Algeria, in 2008, 2010, and
2014, respectively, all in computer science. Since
2014, he is a senior lecturer with the Department of
Computer Science, Guelma University, Algeria. His
research interests include wireless network security,
network coding security, and applied cryptography.
He serves on the Editorial Board of several In-
ternational peer-reviewed journals such as the IET
Networks (IET), the International Journal of Infor-
mation Security and Privacy (IGI Global), the International Journal of Internet
Technology and Secured Transactions (Inderscience Publishers), and the EAI
Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety (EAI). He has served as an
Organizing Committee Member (the Track Chair, the Co-Chair, the Publicity
Chair, the Proceedings Editor, and the Web Chair) in numerous international
conferences.
Leandros Maglaras (SM’15) received the B.Sc.
degree from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki,
Greece in 1998, M.Sc. in Industrial Production and
Management from University of Thessaly in 2004
and M.Sc. and PhD degrees in Electrical & Com-
puter Engineering from University of Volos, in 2008
and 2014 respectively. He is the head of the National
Cyber Security Authority of Greece and a visiting
Lecturer in the School of Computer Science and
Informatics at the De Montfort University, U.K. He
serves on the Editorial Board of several International
peer-reviewed journals such as IEEE Access, Wiley Journal on Security
& Communication Networks, EAI Transactions on e-Learning and EAI
Transactions on Industrial Networks and Intelligent Systems. He is an author
of more than 80 papers in scientific magazines and conferences and is a senior
member of IEEE. His research interests include wireless sensor networks and
vehicular ad hoc networks.
